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Commons1
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University

Introduction
The commons is a theoretical formalism that is useful in understanding
many diverse problems of civil society. Commons models have been applied to
major environmental issues from resource depletion to global warming
(Ostrom, 1990), legal questions from land ownership to intellectual property
and culture policy (Lessig, 2008), and to understand voluntary associations,
nonprofit organizations and philanthropy (Lohmann, 1992; Van Til, 2000).
Sciences, academic disciplines, professions and knowledge (Hess and Ostrom,
2007) have all been instanced as important examples of commons.
A common (or commons) is any economic, political, social, and legal
institution that enables joint, shared, mutual or collective natural or social
action by agents using a “pool” of shared or jointly held or mutually controlled
resources. The noun common can refer to an actual, existing natural or social
object (such as an ocean, a property or a philanthropic foundation), a unit of
analysis or theoretical formalism (e.g., an ideal or theoretical type) or an
element or figure in an abstract logical construct or narrative (e.g., “commons
tragedy” or prisoner’s dilemma games) used to highlight or isolate certain
related political, social, economic or legal phenomena.
Common pool resources (CPR) refers to any collection of resources affected
by and facilitating action (physical or social) by a plurality of natural,
physical, legal, economic or social agents. The term common goods is used to
characterize actual or planned products, outputs, goals, or desired ends of
common choice or action.

Historical Background
Common fields agriculture is an ancient and medieval institution found in
many areas throughout the world. English common law has engendered a
rich vocabulary of practical and legal terms with precise (mostly agricultural)
meanings, like common pasture (right to graze animals on common land),
estover (right to collect wood from smaller trees), piscary (common rights to
fish), tubary (right to collect sod), and mast (right to turn out pigs in the fall).
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A widespread assumption has been that the “enclosure” (privatization) of
property commons is a universal correlate of economic modernization and
privatization of property. Even so, intellectual and academic interest in
contemporary commons has grown across a broad front since the late 1960s,
stemming from an essay in Science (Hardin, 1968) asserting a “tragic”
trajectory in the tendency to over-utilize natural resources, for which the only
viable solution was said to be public ownership and control. Although little
employed by civil society researchers, Hardin’s analysis – like similar work
by Mancur Olson (1965) and others – detailed various consequences of
uncoordinated private decision-making. The commons model has continued to
find many enthusiasts among researchers and theorists in environmental
and life sciences, economics, law, history, political theory, agriculture,
sociology and numerous other theoretical and applied disciplines that have
invoked diverse models of commons, common pool resources (CPRs) and
common goods to reframe an increasingly broad range of practical and
theoretical issues. The literature on commons problems has grown so
dramatically that reviewing it completely would be almost impossible. The
International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC) is an
interdisciplinary research society formed in 1989 exclusively for work on the
topic. (www.iascp.org/)

International Perspectives
To locate civil society commons studies relative to the larger body of
commons research and the international interdisciplinary body of commons
researchers, a literature review of a large body of recent work on the
commons was conducted. (See Lohmann, 2008) A representative sample of
the identified studies were categorized in a three-part typology as follows (see
Figure 1):
A substantial body of work exists detailing natural common resource pools
acted upon by physical or biological agents (denoted as NRPs in Figure 1).
These include studies of the electromagnetic spectrum, ‘associations’ of star
galaxies, geothermal energy commons, microbial populations, and plant
water use. Natural commons studies works within the basic commons model
of a shared resource pool, identified natural “agents” and natural chemical or
physical processes of “agency” responsible for changing the distribution of
resources from that pool.
There is also a second large body of work (denoted humanly-directed
natural resource pools or DNRPs in Figure 1) on the human-natural
environment interface, interspecies conflict and population density. One of
the most widely studied topics is in the broad area of conservation,
environmental and evolutionary biology and natural resource management
and spatial issues. Much recent work on the commons specifically engages
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human social institutions impacting natural resource pools. Historical
investigations, for example, tend to focus on real, actual instances of past and
present common agricultural lands and practices. There is a widespread false
belief that common field agriculture was limited primarily to England and
Wales in the late middle ages. This and widespread belief in the ineluctably
“tragic” nature of common resource pool management are perhaps the two
greatest fallacies associated with commons theory.
Commons have also been located in most of the countries of Europe,
Japan, India, Indonesia and countless other places. Common problems in law
also extend to common arable fields, maintenance of shared property lines
and a host of such issues (Ellickson, 1991). There is also a vast literature on
fisheries and common pastures. Scrutton (1887) may be the earliest work in
the vast literature on common field agriculture. The enclosure movement in
Great Britain, which “enclosed” many common pastures and fields and
“privatized” ownership has figured prominently in what Karl Polanyi (2001;
first published in 1941) termed “the great transformation” as well as analyses
of public welfare and charity systems. (e.g., Cloward and Piven, 1971) Many
studies of commons emphasize local and community referents, and reinforce
the sense of an intermediate stage between the public domain of nation state
institutions and the purely private domains characterized by alienation,
ownership, exclusion, and rivalry (the domain of civil society).
Recent issues in information technology and copyright issues have shown
the continuing impact of commons models. (Brown, 2002; Lessig, 2001). One
of the important issues in current copyright debates, for example, involves
efforts to privatize knowledge and corresponding efforts for the attempted
identification of knowledge commons (Hess and Ostrom, 2006; WilliamsJones, 2005). It is not an accident that there have been vast increases in the
number of web-sites incorporating commons themes, including many
associated with the “open source” movement. Two examples are particularly
apt. Apache is the most widely used open-source web server on the internet,
serving roughly half of all known websites. The data archive where Apache
code “applets” are archived is known as the Apache Commons
(commons.apache.org). Equally as significant is the Creative Commons
licensure approach to copyright and intellectual property
(creativecommons.org). The use of the term “commons” in both cases to
signify a group-directed, collectively held, common resource pool has
provoked a large and growing literature. Both the Apache Commons and the
Creative Commons actually function as common resource pools, drawn upon
by human and electronic agents.
Likewise, medical and health care research have taken interest in the
commons along a variety of paths including studies of health, emergency
medicine, family medicine, Canadian Medicare, pathology, and public health
campaigns.
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A large body of commons studies also take specific historical, geographic
or community foci, including works on pastoralism, the Anasazi, the Buffalo
Commons, cattle ranges, fish mining, groundwater, grasslands, rangeland,
folkways.
In addition, the environmental movement has provoked concern with
global commons including oceans, atmosphere, and Antarctica and also world
systems and global commons as public goods.
Commons studies have also looked at a broad variety of topics more
directly related to the role of commons in civil society, including a
companionate concept termed the anti-commons to describe cases of exclusion
of multiple rights. Harrington (2004) applied the commons model to civic life
to suggest “an alternative analytical framework for civic engagement based
on small-group interaction”. Carlsson and Berkes (2005) addressed comanagement as “a continuous problem-solving process … involving extensive
deliberation, negotiation and joint learning within problem-solving
networks”. Antoci, et. al., (2006) and Kase, et. al. (2008), examined firms and
nonprofit organizations as commons, with particular focus on trust and
learning. Macy (2003) fit the commons model to collective action and the
dilemma for organizers of balancing “efficacy” and “the free rider problem”.
Casas-Corts, et. al., (2008) examined social movements.
Other recognized civil society topics approached as commons include:
mutual aid and self-help (Borkman, 1999); collective intelligence (Wolpert
and Turner, 1999); cooperation (Helbing, et. al., 2005; Kollock, 1998);
discourse (Ignatow, 2004), folkecology (Atran, et. al., 1999A; Atran, et. al.,
1999B); the future (Cain, 2003); governance (Ostrom, 1990); narcissism
(Campbell, et. al., 2005); professional environments (Abbott, 2005); prosocial
behavior (Brucks and Lange, 2007; reputation (Millinski, et.al, 2002); social
issues (Aram, 1989); trans-generational altruism (Lehmann, 2007);
universities (Brown, 2000) and volunteering (Semmann, et. al., 2003)
While defined resource pool and agents (together with appropriate
identification of causal mechanisms) may be both necessary and sufficient in
consideration of natural commons, both humanly directed natural resource
commons or purely social or artificial commons require economic, political
and social explanations. In both cases, we may speak of the social
organization of commons.

Social Organization Of Commons
The organization of natural commons is a matter completely outside our
concern. The social organization of artificial commons, completely organized
and directed by human social action, and human-directed common resource
pools of natural resources, shown graphically on the left side of Figure 1,
raise several interesting questions. Most notable is the question of what can

5
be said about the social organizations that create, direct and control CRPs?
The remainder of this article addresses a social organizational perspective on
commons problems in civil society, with particular attention to those
involving associations, foundations, social movements, some nonprofit firms
and other forms of collective and voluntary action. (Figure 1)
Given the prominence of artificial and humanly-directed common resource
pools, it is somewhat surprising how little sustained attention has been given
to the question of their organization. Lohmann (1992) is one of only a few
sources to examine this issue from the standpoint of general social and
economic theory. In that account, the presence of common resource pools, or
shared resources, is one of three basic, defining conditions of the social
organization of commons. Also important are voluntary, uncoerced
participation of groups of people and mission, or a shared sense of goals or
purpose.
When groups directed by a joint mission control one or more common
resource pools, several things are said to happen over time. First, a sense of
philia, or camaraderie, or fellow-feeling will develop among the members; a
development which itself can become a powerful resource for the commons.
The resulting trust and networks of relationships that evolve form a
distinctive and important form of social capital. At the same time, groups of
voluntary participants, possessed of purpose and shared resources can also
begin to evolve an emergent moral order, consisting of operating and
procedural rules (e.g., by-laws), status systems (e.g., officers, membership
requirements, etc.), and other more powerful mission and vision statements,
and even manifestos, philosophies, and intentional communities and ways of
life. As part of this process, individual participants frequently experience
mild to profound modifications in their sense of personal identity. Thus, being
a scientist or social scientist , a Christian or Buddhist, a Shriner, Elk or
Moose, a computer hacker or an open source practitioner, are all examples of
identities associated with distinct moral orders arising out of participation in
commons.
In the case of social commons, at least three important forms of commonpool resources can be identified: One, of course, is money, credit, donations
and other financial resources. Also particularly important in the case of
religious organizations, museums, libraries, and other types of civil society
organizations are collections of “priceless” objects that differ from business
inventories in that the objects are valued for themselves and not for their
exchange value. The mundane meaning of the term “priceless” applied to
such objects connotes not only that they are not priced and not for sale, but
also that their non-monetary (ritualistic, symbolic or other social) value is of
greater importance.
Finally, some of the most intriguing types of common pooled resources
found in social commons are repertories of social skills, practices,
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methodologies, and other social behaviors. Both the performance of such
repertories and the underlying knowledge of such performances are
important. Addressing repertories as common-pool resources open many
possibilities for commons theory to bring together a broad variety of social
science insights. For example, the sociologist Charles Tilly has identified
important features of repertories of contention in pre-industrial social
movements. Likewise, an important theorist of social capital, Pierre
Bourdeau also offered an important study of practice that can be applied
here. The strong emphasis on methodology in various social science research
specialties is also an important form of repertory as a common-pool resource.
Many different types of common pool resources are to some extent
fungible, or convertible from one form to another, in commons: Thus, cash can
be used to hire employees with expertise in particular repertories, purchase
objects for a collection, or as tuition for development of new repertories. At
the same time, collections can be used to attract large and small donations
from patrons, and form the basis for all manner of repertories to evolve
(archeological excavation and restoration, curation of objects d’art,
propagation, preservation and myriad other distinct and identifiable
repertories have evolved around different types of collections).
An important discovery of commons theory has been that some types of
repertory that are not initially viable commercially because no markets for
them exist can be developed and refined by organizations in civil society
possessing common resource pools. Some such developments will later
become commercially viable while others do not. Thus, many forms of home
health and education services were first developed with common pool
resources and later became commercially viable. In some sense, commercial
art galleries and companies selling classical music recordings are likewise
dependent upon the prior existence of art museums and symphony orchestras
to shape and develop tastes and preferences which art and music buyers can
then act upon.
Common resource pools in civil society are also important in processes of
government formation. Public funds may not be available, for example, for
the complex and elaborate repertories and social and political capital that a
President, Prime Minister or Governor must engage to form a new
government following an election. Identifying, recruiting and vetting suitable
candidates are typically tasks undertaken by ad hoc networks of political
parties, interest groups and other factions, utilizing common resource pooled
funds donated – often by those expecting to receive some consideration from
the new government.
A staggering variety of terms exist in every language for different types of
commons as social organizations: In English, we speak of groups,
associations, clubs, societies, fraternities, sororities, sodalities, peer and
friendship groups, parties, campaigns and many other terms to describe
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pluralities of persons gathered together outside the bounds of the political
state, economic markets or family-households for various shared, collective or
mutual purposes. Foundations are an important form of legally constituted
and formally organized common resource pool in contemporary civil society.
Some forms of common resource pooling are purposely temporary:
fundraising campaigns, parades, festivals and religious pilgrimages are
notable examples.
In the U.S., Section 501 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Act, for example, is
one major enabling statute for a wide variety of common resource pools.
Similar enabling legislation exists in most countries today. In the U.S.,
legislation tends to focus heavily on financial matters: Laws typically spells
out the conditions under which financial resources may be pooled and held,
conditions for defining membership and participation, and allowable
circumstances for distributions from common resource pools, whether
fisheries, forests or philanthropic foundations. “Property”, “contract”, “lawful
purpose” and the “right of association” which explicitly includes both
“peaceable assembly” and petitioning government for “redress of grievances”
(a.k.a. advocacy) are important concepts around which the legal institutions
for enabling common resource pooling are established in American life. Such
legal principles obviously do not extend to natural commons, but only to
common resource pools in which human agents are paramount in importance.

Common Goods
Lohmann (1992) also links a distinctive type of output of the concerted use
of common pooled resources termed common goods as the product of
production based on common resource pools. These are, he asserts, a distinct
third category of goods distinct from both public and private goods. It is now
clear that there are not one, but two categories of such intermediate goods:
Those that are rivalrous, but not exclusive; and those that are exclusive but
not rivalrous. (It is also possible that these may, in fact, be two different
states of common goods under different circumstances.) These distinctions
have typically been hedged in many civil society discussions with phrases like
“quasi-private” goods and “semi-public” goods. We might simply term them
“club goods” and “community goods”.
Embracing two logically distinct intermediate types of common goods to
supplant the two different forms of sort-of-private and quasi-public goods is a
straightforward logical exercise invoked by removing in turn one of the two
defining characteristics of public goods, as the contingency table (Figure 2)
shows. Differentiation of rivalrous, non-exclusive (community) goods from
non-rivalrous, exclusive (club) goods is also a key to understanding the
importance of commons theory for civil society.
In point of fact, the decision-making by agents of common resource pools
in civil society are not restricted to any particular type of good. CRPs can be
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used to produce all four types of goods shown in Figure 2. Thus, for example,
the common resource pool of a private, or voluntary charity or faith-based
organization may be utilized to make financial payments or provide services
to individual poor, ill or other clients. As such, this constitutes production of
an important form of private charity goods. In U.S. law and the English Poor
Law tradition, efforts are made to carefully restrict such production (e.g., for
the poor or sick, for educational purposes, etc.)
Conversely, social clubs, membership organizations, and a bewildering
variety of other associations are engaged in the production of (non-rivalrous,
excludable) club goods, which may be available only to members as “member
benefits” and non-rivalrous, often largely on the basis of disinterest on the
part of nonmembers. Thus, members of stamp-collecting clubs may have
exclusive access to certain first-issue stamps; a fact that may be of
overwhelming disinterest to non-collectors. Non-collectors wishing to share in
the benefit are encouraged to join and thereby become eligible.
Club goods are significantly different from private and public goods but
also from community goods, like various bodies of knowledge. An abstraction
one might term the social organization of the calculus serves to illustrate the
point. Calculus (like Shakespeare or Mandarin for English-speakers) is an
esoteric but widely studied and important body of knowledge. First developed
by Newton and Liebnitz and passed from teacher to student in mathematics,
science and engineering since that time, calculus-knowledge might at first be
thought to be a club good of sorts: the basis of an international society of those
who know calculus. However, calculus is in several important senses, nonexcludable. Just about anyone on the planet could, with a little effort, have
access to a calculus text, and there is no practical limit on the number of
people who may learn calculus, and knowledge of calculus by anyone does not
exclude, limit or restrict the ability of others to learn it; in fact, it facilitates
it, as a subset of those who know calculus form the pool of those who teach
calculus. However, the club of those who know calculus is, like many forms of
knowledge, rivalrous in an important opportunity cost sense. Calculus is a
rivalrous good in the important sense that life is short and the cost of
learning calculus is measured in reduced time available to study
Shakespeare or Mandarin or some other subject. Thus, calculus knowledge is
not strictly speaking, a club good but rather a community good because of the
effort involved in learning it and the exclusion resulting from the fact that
not everyone can.

Key Issues
Currently, there are many different disciplinary, professional and cultural
approaches to the study of commons, not all of them cognizant of one another.
A key issue for future development is whether different threads of commons
research and theorizing can be informed by, and profit from, one another.
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Hess (2000) correctly notes that the commons theory presented in Lohmann
(1992) was developed with little reference to the body of work presented
through the IASC. Krashinsky (1995) made a similar observation of the
dissimilarities between Lohmann’s third sector approach and the common
goods economics of Ostrom, et. al. (Baden and Noonan, 1998; Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom, 1994, et. al.). In the same vein, work on natural resource commons
or common good economics has likewise seldom been informed by even the
most elementary understanding of civil society, associations, groups or
organization research. Some groups engaged with common resource pools are
sets of inanimate objects or chemical agents, insects or animals and other
clusters completely outside the domain of civil society. But those in which
agents controlling common resource pools are human social groups have
much to gain from better understanding of the civil society context.

Future Directions
Examination of recent research on common resource pools shows three
basic varieties. Natural resource pools are of relatively little interest to civil
society studies. The other two branches, social or artificial common resource
pools and humanly directed natural resource pools, are both of significant
interest to civil society studies, and current research on these covers a
bewildering variety of topics, issues and questions. No one can say for sure
where commons studies are headed next. In fact, every few years we see the
emergence of an entirely new and evocative branch of interest grounded in
this fascinating metaphor, as Benkler (2006) has demonstrated most
recently.

See Also
Mission
Membership and membership associations
Peasants’ and farmers’ organizations
Social capital
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Figure 1. Types of Commons:
Social(SRPs), Directed Natural (DNRPs) and Natural Resource Pools (NRPs)
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Figure 2
Public, Private and Intermediate Goods
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Figure 3
Ostrom & Ostrom Version
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